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FOREWORD 
The general theme of the series in which this essay appears is 
"Ethics and Foreign Policy." This series represents no single point of 
view; it is designed, rather, to draw upon those various important 
strands, moral and political, which contribute to our common heritage. 
Underlying the diversity of views there is, however, a unity. All of the 
essays attempt to relate religious and moral insight to urgent problems 
of international affairs. 
The proposition which Gordon Zahn examines and advocates runs 
counter to many commonly held beliefs and attitudes, but it too derives 
from a long tradition. Dr. Zahn has been one of the most persuasive and 
persistent advocates of non-violent action in this country. In this essay 
he examines the theory of non-violence against the background of 
threatened nuclear war. 
Dr. Zahn is Professor of Sociology at Loyola University, Chicago. 
He was a Fulbright Research Scholar in Germany during 1956-7. In 
1961 he received an American Philosophical Society Grant and in 1962, 
as the result of years of research, he published his widely acclaimed and 
debated study German Catholics and Hitler's Wars. The discussion of 
the morality of modern war which he initiated in that book he further 
develops in this essay. 
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JAMES FINN 
Director of Publications 
The Council on Religion 
and International Affairs 
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The Problem 
In the long-awaited conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests 
in the atmosphere and in underwater and outer space environments, we 
may have reached a significant turning point in world history. The agree-
ment, limited though it is, might be a sign that men are now ready to 
abandon the callous disregard for human life which might otherwise 
prove to be the final bitter fruit of human civilization. But, however 
much we may hope that this is the case, our optimism must be tempered 
by the memory that not too long ago leaders on both sides of the cold-
war battle lines were proclaiming their readiness to match test with 
test regardless of the globe-circling pall of potentially lethal fall-out each 
new round of tests would have loosed. We have seen this callousness in 
operation before - in the technological triumphs of two murderous 
world wars and the atrocities made possible by these "advances," to cite 
an obvious example. We have seen it, too, in the horrifying spectacle of 
Hitler's "Final Solution of the Jewish Question," and its echoes are still 
encountered all too often when people, here or in Germany, quibble 
about the exact number of millions of persons so exterminated - as if 
the enormity of the crime lay in the calculation and not in the fact that 
there were men who were prepared to destroy any number of other men 
to achieve the goals set by their perverted ideals and dreams of a future 
and, in their eyes, better world. 
There are men among us today, and they are legion, who are pre-
pared to destroy other men in pursuit of other goals, admittedly more 
laudable and reasonable in our eyes. Some of them are ordinary men 
plagued by insecurity or fretful with impatience; others are distin-
guished political, military, and even scientific leaders. Dr. Edward 
Teller, for example, assures us that in a nuclear war it would be probable 
that no more than 10% of the American population would be wiped out; 
and Ernest Lefever, calculates the possible loss at 20% of the earth's 
population (with the additional note that most of this would occur 
north of the Equator). Converting these percentages to absolute num-
bers, we find therein a willingness, however reluctant, to prepare for a 
war that would, in one instance, kill approximately 18 million Ameri-
cans and, in the other (a more meaningful expectation in that it appar-
ently takes into account the enemies of a victorious America and any 
other nations which happen to be in the vicinity of combat), the even 
more impressive total of more than 700 million. 
No one will question whether the aims and purposes motivating 
the nuclear optimists are more laudable than those of the Nazis - they 
7 
most certainly are. But one must ask whether or not any aims and pur-
poses can justify the inhumanities these men are prepared to support. 
Christian Geissler, referring to the tragic history of Auschwitz and Hiro-
shima, made the point in these words: "Anyone whose mind is capable 
of developing (and this means, for future use) justifications in the 
presence of such calculated mass murder - or, to be more specmc, for 
the 'planned and willed burning of 200,000 people; anyone whose mind 
can in any sense entertain .justifications here instead of seeking to use 
these to effect the most stringent correction of our moral sensibilities 
by holding these happenings before Qur eyes as the horribly certain 
consequences of the organized misappropriation of better human 
capabilities - such a mind is corrupt, its thinking is infected by the 
genocidal habits of thought of the fascist." 
Geissler's judgment lends chilling immediacy to Albert Schweitzer's 
warning: "Increasingly there is lost the consciousness that every man 
is an object of concern for us just because he is a man; civilization and 
morals are shaken and the advance to fully developed inhumanity is 
only a question of time." 
Perhaps it is no longer "a question of time." Perhaps we have 
already "advanced" to "fully developed inhumanity" when we reach 
the point at which a nation's scientific genius foresees a weapon which 
will destroy all vestige. of human life and leave undamaged the buildings 
and other material objects in its area of destruction - and when that 
nation's journalists and senators join in the chorus demanding that this 
be accomplished posthaste. What more ultimate expression of the dis-
regard for human life can be imagined? What more ghastly reversal of 
values than this which proposes to destroy God's proudest creation 
and carefully preserve the passing creations of human technology? 
It is all too clear that man's frantic pl,lrsuit of security through 
violence has led us to this dead end where, like the strange and unnamed 
animal of Kafka's Burrow, we find ourselves the captive of our own fear-
created devices. Indeed, the simile is apt in more ways than one if we but 
consider the suburbanite hard at work digging the family fall-out shelter 
and loudly proclaiming (with the nodding approval of the professional 
theologian) his right and intention to man a machine gun at its entrance, 
if necessary, to repel any threatened invasion by his neighbor's children. 
We have mastered the arts of violence to the point that we now have it 
within our power to destroy the world and annihilate its population. 
And in the process have we not destroyed the very hope of security we 
had sought and jeopardized the continued existence of ourselves, our 
potential enemies (and friends), and - the cruelest injustice of all-
the generations, if any, still to come? 
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The Proposed Alternative 
This total failure of total violence to provide the security we crave 
presents us with what is at once a pressing need and a great opportunity 
to develop some alternative means to achieve the security we desire and ' 
to preserve the values we hold dear. More than this, it provides us with 
a definite hint as to the direction this alternative must take if it is to offer 
any hope of success. Instead of contributing further to the denigration 
of man, a new approach to security must recognize and rest upon the 
concern for man - any man, including our potential enemy - just be-
cause he is a man. We must resolve that if, in the words of John XXIII, 
"individual human beings are and should be the foundation, the end 
and the subjects of all the institutions in which social life is carried on," 
these institutions can never be given absolute priority over the worth of 
these individual human beings. Therefore, our means of defense must 
be so organized and our policies S'O developed that they find their effec-
tiveness in the identification and exploitation of the essentially human 
qualities and capacities in ourselves and the potential enemy and not in 
the continued effort to destroy the greatest possible number of "them" 
at the least possible cost to "us." 
Such an alternative presents itself in the complex of ideals and tech-
niques usually covered by the negative term, non-violence. At least one 
can say that a growing number of serious-minded men are beginning to 
consider it as a possible alternative. In his coldly analytical survey of 
the positions represented by the unilateralists and their opponents, who 
favor maintenance of nuclear parity, Walter Stein rejects both as ulti-
mate answers to the problem facing us. The answer, he insists, is the 
creation of "a radically new international order"; but this merely raises 
for him the new problem of how such an order is to emerge from our 
present world state of "mutual anathema and terror·." It is necessary, 
he insists, to will the means to make this possible, and he goes on to say: 
I have argued that to will the means of peace in our situation is to be 
ready to bear very great risks indeed (though we cannot, anyway, 
avoid very grave risks of one kind or another). In effect, we should have 
to be prepared for unilateral risk-taking (or the equivalent of unilateral 
risk-taking-whatever the diplomatic formalities) and so ultimately for 
non-violent resistance. 
Thomas Merton, too, reaches the conclusion "that we must defend 
freedom and sanity against the bellicose fanaticism of all warmakers, 
whether 'ours' or 'theirs' and that we must strive to do so not with 
force but with the spiritual weapons of Christian prayer and action. But 
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this action must be at once non-violent and decisive. Good intentions 
and fond hopes are not enough." 
Thus, through non-violence our real and absolute defenselessness 
in the face of the new instruments of total destruction can be converted 
into power, a kind of power which could prove far more effective in 
the final reckoning than any breakthrough in megaton potential or in 
the accuracy and range of the instruments of delivery. 
Non-violence is not to be dismissed as a passive surrender to or a 
defeatist compliance with the putative violent aggressor; instead, it is a 
form of concerted activity which is intended to generate the power to 
compel an opponent, negatively, to desist from an actual or anticipated 
program of action ("passive resistance") or, positively, to institute a 
program of action desired by the party utilizing it. To risk a slight 
terminological difference with Merton as he is quoted above, I would 
insist that non-violence, like violence, constitutes force and should be so -
regarded in any consideration of its merits as a policy alternative. It 
represents a contest of will and spirit in place of our present tests of the 
relative strength of the material resources and supporting technology 
of the combatants. As such, its advocates would insist, non-violence is a 
more ultimate kind of power, one which ranges above and beyond the 
more limited potentialities of violence. Gandhi and his fonowers called 
it "soul force"; the Christian pacifist speaks of the "power of love," of 
a "charity" that can overcome the world. 
In its essence, non-violence, since it rests upon the force of the 
"soul" and the practice of the virtue of ,love, is a personal act. To this 
extent, then, one might object that it does not lend itself to the group 
activity such as would be required in the context of a national defense 
alternative. But this is at most a paradox and certainly not the dis-
qualification such objections might suggest. The same paradox may be 
seen in the practice of violence: the "army" attacks or retreats, but in 
reality it is the individual members of that army who strike or fall back 
as the case may be. Yet one must admit that there is a vital difference 
between the two - the individual can be conditioned to perform un-
thinkingly acts of violence; the efficient practice of non-violence, how-
ever, must involve a deep personal commitment and, in its most perfect 
form, requires of its practitioners a degree of self-mastery and dedica-
tion customarily associated with religious immolation. Non-violence on 
the group level, then, does not arise from welding an . assortment of 
separate individuals into a functioning collectivity but, instead, fron1 
creating a community of committed persons and inspiring them into 
concurrent but always responsible and intentioned patterns of behavior. 
In its statement, this might suggest an impossible ideal. Admittedly, 
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it has rarely, if ever, been perfectly attained. Yet significant victories 
have been won through the application of non-violence by groups, and 
some of these victories have been quite recent. 
The dramatic series of successful assaults upon long-standing pat-
terns of racial discrimination and injustice which have taken the form of 
"sit-in", "kneel-in", and even "wade-in" demonstrations has demonstrated 
its effectiveness. Negroes are now eating at lunch counters from which 
they were formerly excluded; elsewhere they are now able to enjoy the 
use of the beach facilities from which they had been driven by hate-
inspired mobs. Of course, the scope of these victories may be discounted 
in the context of a proposal that such techniques be tried on an inter-
national scale; but two important points must be noted. 
In a very real sense, the '''Freedom Riders" and other non-violent 
demonstrators have incited an astonishing degree of fear in those who 
seek to uphold the threatened patterns. This is reflected in the anxiety 
with which whole communities have organized to speed them out of 
town and in the haste with which the discriminating restauranteur closes 
up shop when word of their approach reaches him. 
The other significant aspect is the as yet unmeasured gain - and 
the most essentially relevant to the underlying rationale of non-violence 
-the extent to which these visible accomplishments have been made 
possible because many of those who previously had accepted and defen-
ded the patterns of exclusion and discrimination have been forced to 
question and reject them. Such a re-assessment and conversion may usu-
ally be traced to the converfs inner reactions of admiration for the dedi-
cation and personal brav~ry of the demonstrators or of revulsion against 
the coarseness and brutality evidenced by the die-hard defenders of segre-
gation. It is precisely these reactions inspired in the other that constitute 
the critical mass of the weapons of non-violence and which have made 
possible the earlier and more extensive victories recorded in the early 
Christians' conversion of the pagan Empire and Gandhf s successful 
campaign for Indian independence. The non-violence alternative is 
keyed to a universalistic identity with and concern for the humanity 
inherent in all men, including the potential aggressor. And this, in turn, 
is expected at some point to trigger a reciprocal response in the opposing 
party; to fan, so to speak, the spark of human decency which, no matter 
how low it may burn in individual men for a time, cannot be extinguished 
completely or forever. 
With the fall-out from past series of bomb tests (some of which 
could have destroyed the world's greatest city in the flash of an instant ) 
still presenting its lingering threat to mankind's health and well-being, 
it may seem utterly unreasonable to propose as a counter-measure a set 
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of techniques associated in the public mind with a handful of college 
students at a drugstore counter or a few hundred fanatics sitting in a 
London street. Again, the barbed wire and the concrete blocks of the 
Berlin wall, not to mention the tanks and well-armed men behind it, 
seem to present a situation totally invulnerable to the fasts and spinning 
wheels of any number of frail old men. If these were indeed all that 
non-violence did propose, I fear that few, if any, reasonable men could 
be induced to give it even a passing moment's consideration as a pos-
sible alternative to the present quest for ever greater and ever more 
effective destructive potential which seeks to assure, if not the desired 
advantage 'Over all likely enemies, at least a continuation of the balance 
of terror which today holds them (just as it holds us) in check. 
The sad truth, however (and this too must be granted by our 
"reasonable men"), is that this balance of terror is only a sometime thing 
and, even when achieved, is se~-defeating since, by definition, the 
enemy~s terror finds its counterpart in our own. This situation necessarily 
provokes each to attempt to undo the balance, to gain superiority by 
some breakthrough. Or, failing this, it creates the kind of continuing 
tension and strain which could lead one party or the other into the panic 
of desperation in which the hidden terrors of tomorrow become far 
worse than the known terrors of today and the attempt is made to break 
out of the confining circle whatever it may cost. 
To this point in time, of course, the balance has not been destroyed 
and everything has not, as yet, gone "boom." This fact has comforted 
many and has been interpreted by them as proof of the efficacy of the 
so-called "deterrence~~ policy. It is difficult to justify the comfort or to 
accept the interpretation. A far more plausible illustration might be that 
a favorable enough calculation has not yet been produced by the com-
puters serving either of the potential combatants; if true, this would be 
more a matter of each "biding his time" instead of being effectively 
"deterred.~~ At whatever point the expected gains can clearly and cer-
tainly promise to outweigh the expendables, the "deterrence~~ will vanish 
completely. 
That the situation is one of each biding his time until he is in the 
more certainly advantageous position may be seen in the threats and 
counterthreats relative to atmospheric nuclear testing before the recent 
treaty was concluded. Both major atomic powers loudly proolaimed their 
concern over the effects of such tests - yet both maintained they were 
prepared to continue them to whatever point was necessary for each to 
gain or maintain the desired advantage. Thus, the United States boasted 
of its superiority but insisted it had to test because the Soviet tests 
threatened to reduce or remove that superiority; for their part, the 
Soviets insisted that the threatened resumption 'Of American testing 
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would have obliged them to initiate a new series of tests to further 
perfect their monster bombs; and so on and so on. Even now, after the 
test-ban treaty has become a reality, it is significant that arguments for 
its ratification by the Senate had to stress the fact that the agreement 
will preserve the advantage we claim. 
Seen in this light the maintenance and expansion of national nuclear 
arsenals is every bit as much - and, properly speaking, much more so 
- a policy of incitements as it is one of deterrence. Perhaps the most 
terrifying fact of all (and this is the final refutation of the deterrence 
thesis) is the manner in which the "expendable" allowance keeps pace 
with the annihilation capacity of the new weapons. There are already 
minds which are not only able to entertain justifications for the incinera-
tion of 200,000, 6 million, 18 million and 700 million, but have actually 
reached the point of justifying the possible extermination of human life 
altogether rather than expose future generations to the risk of Com-
munist domination. This disordered theology-which is remarkable if 
only in the implied suggestion that God would be helpless in dealing 
with a Communist victory and the world order it would bring - cer-
tainly introduces a framework which would remove the last suggestion 
of "deterrence" as far as our own leaders and their policies are concerned . . 
Our situation is, therefore, one in which we have the actuality of 
total destruction at our command without the security it was to have 
brought us. It is in such a context that the potentiality of non-violence 
as an alternative deserves thoughtful consideration. And that potentiality 
is not to be measured in terms of scattered hundreds of people protesting 
air-raid tests in New York City or Polaris bases in Scotland. Instead, it 
offers a two-fold advantage: first, the immediate reduction in the fears of 
the potential enemy would make possible a relaxation of tensions and 
open the way to a new association based on confidence and, in time, 
trust; second, his recognition that any attempt to exploit the changed 
situation through violent aggression would be rendered futile by a 
nation mobilized and trained in the use of civil disobedience and total 
non-cooperation would impose a note of prudent restraint upon him. 
At least such is the argument for non-violence. This is to say that 
a whole new set of "rules-of-the-game" would be developed for future 
tests of international power. As these rules now stand, the losers in 
wars, having matched violence with violence to the limit of their ability, 
are expected to acknowledge their defeat once it is accomplished and 
to accept the consequences of conforming to the demands imposed upon 
them by the victors. The new set of rules would be altogether different. 
They would envision a situation in which the violent aggressor would 
probably - though not automatically, nor even necessarily -win the 
initial victory over the opponent committed to non-violent defense. 
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But that victory would soon be revealed as a hoHow and altogether 
meaningless prize in the face of a total and disciplined refusal on the 
part of the victim population to recognize the victor's power or conform 
to his will. For the victor there would be no "spoils." 
Such a formulation effectively destroys the false dichotomy of the 
current "red-or-dead" controversies. It now becomes possible to con-
ceive of a nation refusing to make the choice in favor of death for its 
population (and 700 million others!) and, at the same time, refusing to 
become "red" just because Communist officials supported by Communist 
troops attempt to take over. The answer lies in converting the tempting 
fruits of a violent victory into the bitter reality of an unmanageable 
liability. 
In the process, of course, the refusal to conform or cooperate would 
cost the lives of many who would be sacrificed as victims of terror or 
reprisal actions. And this number would undoubtedly be far greater at 
the hands of soldiers who are products of a totalitarian regime and 
schooled in total obedience and total commitment to a perverted ideol-
ogy than was the case, let us say, for imperial forces called into action 
to subdue and repress colonials who were only demanding rights similar 
to their own. Even so, however, there would be a limit, a limit set by 
the fact that no amount of indoctrination and no system of psychological 
formation, however intensive they may be, can completely unmake a 
man in the sense of changing his essential human nature. At some point, 
even the totalitarian automaton will have to react as a man; and this 
will be, for him, the breaking point. Only so many trains will run over 
so many bodies before the trains stop running altogether; only so many 
hostages will be executed before the executioners refuse to shed more 
innocent blood. Perhaps it is starry-eyed idealism to speak of such 
limits; but to deny that they exist and that they must ultimately be 
reached would be a denial of the very dignity and humanity of man, the 
recognition of which we claim as the hallmark of our way of life and the 
justification of its defense. 
But does not the very willingness on the part of the advocates of 
non-violence to contemplate the possible toll in lives to be taken before 
this point is reached constitute a parallel to the callous disregard for 
human life for which the nuclear optimists have been censured? In 
purely quantitative terms, this objection might hold some semblance 
of validity, but it fades away when the comparison is set in qualitative 
terms. There is a vast difference between millions of lives destroyed by 
others in the pursuit of some objective and the readiness on the part of 
even an equal number to suffer the loss of their own lives rather than 
surrender the ideals to which they have committed themselves. The 
difference, and it is a critical one, arises from the recognition that it is 
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better to perish as the victim of the inhumanity of others than to save 
oneself (or one's nation) by making others the victims of our own 
inhuman acts. 
Prerequisites for Non-violence 
Thus non-violence, too, involves a test of breaking-points; but they 
are of a vastly different order than those now presented by war. Just as 
the militarist frames his plans in the assumption that a point can be 
reached at which his opponent will surrender because he can no longer 
endure the horrors visited upon him, so does the advocate of non-
violence assume that a point exists at which the perpetrators of horror 
will break under the strain of the persecution they are ordered to pro-
long. The hypothetical all-out conflict between the violent aggressor 
and the non-violent resister would, in a very real sense, be a test of the 
upper and lower reaches of the human spirit. The advocate of non-
violence is an optimist in that, trusting in the spiritual nature and destiny 
of man, he is confident that the capacity to love and to bear whatever 
sacrifices such love may entail is greater than the human capacity for 
evil- though, in his optimism, he will freely grant that as yet the full 
depths of that capacity for evil may not have been plumbed. 
Because of this, the advocate of non-violence must not stop with 
his optimistic act of faith. Instead, he should recognize and insist upon 
a preparedness and training equal to that now devoted to transforming 
the ordinary man into a brutal killer who can callously perpetrate a 
Lidice or Hiroshima. Indeed, their importance is magnified and com-
plicated by the fact that, whereas the perpetrators of such violence can 
be especially selected and trained for designated tasks, a successful 
demonstration of non-violence would rest upon the full-scale participa-
tion and support of the general population. True, the content and di-
rection of the training program will be different: instead of developing 
the baser potentialities of human nature (the bayonet training with 
recruits encouraged to growl and snarl like animals as they assault the 
dummy is a case in point), the program will have to aim at developing 
the higher spiritual potentialities which will enable the individual to 
accept and withstand whatever suffering and terror his passive resistance 
might bring upon him. But in this effort, conscious organization and 
planning, firm discipline and a strenuous formation framed in terms of 
ethical and religious commitment are essential. 
The preparedness programs now devoted to building and main-
taining the highest possible level of violence potential would have to be 
duplicated to implement a non-violent defense policy. The arguments 
for conscription, for massive budget outlays - in short, for everything 
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associated with the preservation of today's balance of terror- are pre-
mised on the unchallengeable logic that a nation cannot wait until the 
enemy moves to organize a successful defense of its rights. The ordinary 
man, whether he be the friendly young clerk at the supermarket or the 
teacher called from his classroom, has to be "made over," has to be taught 
to understand and use the modem weapons of war and, most crucial of 
all, must be conditioned to a level of virtually automatic and certainly 
unquestioning acceptance of the fact that he is expected to kill other 
human beings - and risk being killed by them. 
It is not much different for non-violence. The same clerk would 
have to be trained in the techniques of civil disobedience and non-
cooperation; he would have to learn to submit to the orders of those 
given the responsibility for planning and directing the total campaign; 
and he would have to be prepared to endure not only the prospect of 
his own death but, much more difficult perhaps, the violent death of 
others about him without resorting to retaliatory violence and thereby 
betraying the cause to which he has been caned. In the one case, a con-
scious and calculated effort is made to transmute the civilian into the 
professional killer by bringing to fullest flower the brutality latent in 
the animal nature of man and stunting or at least controlling the softer 
sensibilities and spiritual inclinations of human nature. In the other, 
the effort would be made to transmute the civilian into the non-violent 
"warrior" by bringing these latter capacities to the threshold of self-
sacrificial fulfillment and controlling to the point of elimination, if pos-
sible, that part of man's nature which is ever too ready to repay evil with 
evil and answer each assault upon him with another and stronger assault 
on his own part. 
The truly astonishing successes that have been scored in the struggle 
for racial equality, first on a limited scale in Montgomery but since then 
on a nation-wide scale, by individuals and groups who operated largely 
on a basis of personal commitment with no formal training and a mini-
mum of organizational discipline and direction, show that it can be done. 
The larger scale success of the Gandhi revolution, with its Vidvapiths 
and Ashrarnas serving as training centers, offers even more impressive 
confirmation. The superficial dramatics of the fasts unto death and the 
marches to the sea should not be permitted to hide the hard core of 
theory and tactics, the planning and timing of each new move, and the 
inflexible insistence upon obedience that received its clearest illustration 
when effective demonstrations-in-progress were abruptly terminated 
because some of the demonstrators had sullied the entire effort by per-
mitting themselves to be provoked into violence. 
Nevertheless, even with its success, the Gandhi movement must be 
regarded as little more than a primitive experiment in the use of non-
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violence. Since his time, startling discoveries have been made in the 
behavioral sciences which have unlocked many of the secrets of motiva-
tional control and provided many valuable insights into the dynamics 
of morale. Many of these findings were made (and employed) in the 
course of World War II when the nation's resources of psychological 
scholarship and talent were mobilized and given the task, among others, 
of selecting and preparing the candidates for the <especial service" forces. 
There is no doubt but that this same professional experience and these 
same tools could be utilized in selecting the types of individuals best 
suited for positions of leadership in non-violence and in developing the 
educational and training programs through which the necessary mass 
participation in the civil disobedience and general non-cooperation 
demonstrations must be achieved. 
Assuming that the radical shift in defense thinking implied in this 
proposal is possible, can one imagine "that it is at all likely? The answer, 
once again, would appear to be a resounding negative if the issue is 
seen only in the context of the present situation. For it is not enough 
that non-violence be recognized as a kind of force which could be effec-
tively organized and employed as an alternative to violence. It is quite 
clear that other prerequisites must be met before this possible alternative 
can be converted into a likely or preferred alternative. 
These additional prerequisites consist, in the main, in a serious re-
examination and revision of present value orientations. In some cases, 
the revision would involve downgrading and deemphasizing - even 
eliminating - some of our most revered values; in others, it would 
require the introduction of new values or the emphasizing of values 
already present but not given the priority they would have to have. 
Foremost among the latter is a meaningful acknowledgment or 
reaffirmation of the personal competence and responsibility of the indi-
vidual member of society to make a rational assessment of a situation 
and the behavior it requires of him. This is, of course, one of those values 
to which we in America regularly give lip service but which, when the 
chips are down, we all too regularly ignore. In issues involving inter-
national tensions or conflicts - or, for that matter, the policies and pro-
grams of the national leadership as they may contribute to those tensions 
and conflicts - this ideal image of the competent and responsible indi-
vidual as citizen is not taken seriously by any significant segment of the 
population. On the contrary, an impressive body of arguments and 
rationalizations is developed to deny the applicability of this image in 
a time of stress. 
It is taken for granted that the individual citizen must ride along 
with the decisions of his government and loyally and manfully do as he 
is told because, in the first place, he does not have access to all the 
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relevant facts and, in the second, even if he did have such access and did 
come to a contrary conclusion, it would be futile if not treasonable for 
him to take an open stand against his government. How many men 
fought and died on the battlefields of World War II - on both sides-
convinced, if they gave any thought at all to the question, that there 
was nothing else for them to do? How many cities were laid waste by 
bombs loosed by men who believed war to be immoral and inhuman but 
who ~'had their orders" and never gave a thought to the possibility of 
refusing to take part in an activity they judged sinful? I have talked to 
such men in America; and one of my most touching interviews in Ger-
many was with a woman whose last recollection of her fallen son was 
the sorrow he expressed, not over the dangers he himself was leaving to 
face, but over the knowledge that he was leading the men under him 
into battle for an unjust cause. 
The common denominator in both instances is the unchallenged 
assumption that once a citizen's duty is defined for him by his nation's 
leaders he has no valid choice but to obey. Somehow, if this pattern is 
ever to be broken, each individual must be convinced that he has the 
right and the competence to judge what is asked of him on the basis 
of the information that is available to him and that he can have some 
impact upon the course of events, even if he must stand alone. Until this 
more exalted image of man is incorporated into our thinking, it is futile 
to expect widespread support for a program of non-violence; for, in the 
last analysis, since the effectiveness of its means lies in the moral strength 
of the individual, the success of the whole program is always likely to 
depend upon that individual standing firm in a situation of extreme 
personal stress. 
But this is only part of it. Once the individual is accorded the 
competence to observe, judge and act for himself, it must be just as 
forcefully affirmed that he has the responsibility to do so. Accepting 
this value and making it effective in shaping the behavior of men would 
eliminate the sad mockery of a prudence behind which so many have 
sought safe haven in times which should try men's souls. Too often 
merit is found and a false satisfaction taken in keeping one's own record 
clean by not performing (if we can help it) the actions we have judged 
adversely - but at the same time, making it possible for these same 
actions to be performed by others less scrupulous than we merely be-
cause we choose to "sit tight" in silence and avoid "sticking our necks 
out." One might suggest that it is this kind of thinking, much more than 
the fanaticism of the true believer, that ultimately provides the surest 
guarantee of success for our modern totalitarian tyrannies; certainly, to 
the extent that it represents a kind of elevated hypocrisy, it is the more 
reprehensible. 
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Yet, as recent history has shown, this is all too often the course of 
action that is excused, justified and even praised, while the unfortunate 
deviant who does stick his neck out is likely to be pitied at best, more 
probably scorned, and sometimes even resented by those who regard his 
deviance as a possible incitement to reprisal against the whole group. 
Geissler, in the article quoted earlier, sees the hopes of mankind 
resting on just such an awareness of responsibility. "It is, however, to be 
strictly demanded of each man in the future that he, together with all 
other men and without any conditions whatsoever limiting their liabili-
ties, make himself responsible for that which has happened upon this 
earth, which is happening today, and which is going to happen in the 
future." It is as simple as that; and he who tries to bow out or who 
counsels resignation to "the inevitable" in a very real sense betrays 
human solidarity, betrays mankind itself. And just as this personal re-
sponsibility devolves upon every man, it is a responsibility for every 
man. Hebrew religious literature contains a passage summarizing it 
nicely: For him who saves even one life, it is as if he saved the whole 
world; for him who destroys even one life, it is as if he destroyed the 
whole world. 
These values are already present in the total system of democratic 
values to which we claim to adhere. Our belief in the dignity of the 
human person is regularly proclaimed and periodically defended by a 
resort to arms. But if this means anything at all, it should mean that we 
must grant to human reason the ability to make a sound and independent 
assessment of a given social situation and to the human will the freedom 
to consent to or reject the decision reached by others - even though 
these "others" be in the majority or occupy the positions of temporal 
authority and power. By the same token, our whole complex of values 
centering around and depending upon the concepts of universal human 
solidarity and the brotherhood of all men, the values from which we 
draw our image of ourselves as our brother's keeper, provide a founda-
tion upon which a more effective appeal to personal responsibility could 
be based. The shameful fact that we usually modify and occasionally 
suppress these values in our surrender to a "prudent realism" which 
gives the benefit of every doubt, no matter how great, to those in 
authority; or that we tend to be concerned with the needs of our 
brothers only after we have made sure of generously providing for our 
own - these facts merely express a hierarchical ordering of values that 
must be changed if non-violence is to have any chance at all of develop-
ing into an acceptable alternative to violence and war. 
Strangely enough, at this point in the argument the two contrasting 
systems of force tend to converge. The question must be raised whether, 
even with these recommended revisions in the present value system, it 
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would be possible to train our supermarket clerk to perform his assigned 
tasks in a non-violent program of resistance. Might he not, in the exercise 
of the competence which is his, decide in favor of some attempt, how-
ever hopeless, to beat back a threat against his own personal or his 
nation's rights and security? Might not his sense of responsibility make 
it impossible for him to witness the slaughter of others, including perhaps 
those most dear to him, without resorting to violence against the killers? 
Indeed, is it not unnatural to expect any other reaction from the ordinary 
man? 
This is, again, the argument positing an automatic self-interest 
calculation on the part of the human animal inclining hiin to defensive 
or even retaliatory responses whenever those interests are threatened. 
It was countered before with something of an affirmation of faith in 
the higher capacities of the human spirit as being at least as "natural" 
to man as the brute capacities exploited in the training for and use of 
violence. It might be well to turn this argument about now and relate 
it to the more familiar war situation. For once we have granted to the 
individual a real measure of competence in making difficult (and not 
automatic) behavioral decisions, on what basis can we assume that he 
could ever be induced to abandon the quiet security of his civil pursuits 
and expose himself to the inconveniences and the grave and imminent 
dangers of war in defense of an abstract ideal when all that would be 
involved was a compliant surrender to the obviously lesser demands of 
the enemy? The "quislings," experience has shown, often have an easy 
and profitable time of it. 
Even the consideration of his responsibility to others dependent 
upon him might argue that our clerk should avoid at all costs anything 
which would involve him and them in such apparently senseless risk 
and sacrifice. It should not be necessary to add, in this connection, that 
the growing certainty of mutual destruction in nuclear warfare strength-
ens both of these arguments considerably. The oft-cited law of self-
preservation, if it is a '1aw" and if it applies at all to the question of 
war and peace (and I am not sure that it does) would have to work 
both ways; and, if anything, it can be maintained that it would operate 
most immediately in the form of preserving one's self by not getting 
involved in the dangerous business of war in the first place, by not 
fighting. 
But, of course, it doesn't work that way. When the call goes out, the 
overwhelming majority of service-eligible men answer it. It is not enough 
to explain this by positing a pleasure-pain calculation in which the 
threatened sanctions of non-compliance are adjudged more certain or 
more painful than the risks involved in answering the call. Instead, the 
usual, and better, explanation is found in what might be called "the 
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ascetic ideal" as exemplified in the glorification of the soldierly life and 
the Heldentod, the heroic death in battle, and in the whole mythology of 
a nation united in dedicated sacrifice. The "convergence" referred to 
above lies in the fact that it is precisely this same ascetic ideal, albeit 
with an altogether different content, which lies at the heart of the theory 
of non-violence. 
The ascetic ideal is manifested in the belief that sacrifice and suffer-
ing can be borne and even sought as a positive good, as a chosen means 
to a desired end. To say that it still has some currency in the military 
ideology is not to deny that its actual impact as a determinant of be-
havior has greatly weakened: the scramble for deferments or, failing 
this, for the safer assignments suggests that few men are really eager 
to offer their lives and substance for the nation's welfare or glory. Despite 
this, however, it still has status as a verbalized good; our clerk will 
almost certainly find much compensatory ego-satisfaction in the assur-
ance (an assurance repeatedly confirmed for him by all his associates) 
that the risks he is forced to take, however hesitantly or unwillingly he 
takes them, are somehow associated with a cause so much bigger than 
he that it can ask even the supreme sacrifice of his life. There is no 
reason why this same process could not be employed to win his accept-
ance of the risks and hardships associated with the non-violence alterna-
tive once he were convinced that they would serve the same or even 
higher goods and offer a greater likelihood of success. 
The same or even higher goods. Can national survival be assured 
by non-violent means? I would go beyond a merely affirmative answer 
to that question and suggest instead that, given the present stage of 
development of military technology coupled with the certainty that both 
the major potential enemies possess a lethal retaliatory or "second 
strike" capability, national survival is possible only if some such alterna-
tive is developed and soon. But are there higher goods that could be 
called into consideration? Again the answer must be yes, though this is 
admittedly a far more sensitive area of decision. One such higher good, 
the advocate of non-violence would insist, is the continued existence 
of mankind itself. The Teller-Lefever optimism notwithstanding, any 
course of action which contemplates the destruction of a major part of 
the world's population and most, if not all, of its greatest accomplish-
ments simply can not be countenanced - even were it the only means 
by which the national good might be defended. And the human spirit 
itself must also be recognized as such a higher good. If it does not profit 
a man to gain the whole world at the cost of his immortal soul, it would 
certainly not profit him to gain or protect his claim to a fragment of the 
world at that price. Thus, any course of action that involves the de-
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humanizing of the actor or his victim or both (something modern war, 
even pre-nuclear war, clearly does involve and perhaps, if one follows 
Gandhfs formulation, even violence in general involves) may not be 
justified by the attainment or preservation of any material good or even 
of spiritual goods of a lesser order. 
Political freedom and national sovereignty cannot be viewed as 
ultimate goods. Goods they are indeed, and goods that are to be sought 
and defended at every legitimate opportunity and by all legitimate 
means. But should the occasion ever arise that such defense would 
involve the sacrifice or surrender of these greater goods, such defense 
simply could not be justified. The advocate of non-violence would insist 
that the practice of violence has reached such a point, and it is for pre-
cisely this reason that he is so insistent upon the urgency of the need 
to consider the alternative he proposes as perhaps the last remaining 
hope for the effective defense of those lesser goods which might other-
wise be lost because the only means available at the time of showdown 
are those which may not be utilized. That there is some support for his 
reasoning in recent events may be seen in the fact that the successes 
non-violence has registered and is registering today have all involved 
the winning or the preservation of political freedom and human rights 
in situations where a resort to violence could not have been successful. 
But granting the legitimate claims of these higher spiritual goods 
to precedence over the material goods of national and physical well-
being, might one not say that we are engaged in the preliminaries to an 
ideological conflict in which, should the Communist enemy gain pre-
dominance, these same spiritual goods would be ignored, denied, and 
ultimately crushed? The question is a troubling one in that it represents 
the most telling objection to the proposals for non-violence. Yet it, too, 
is in the end an unsound objection. The battles of the spirit will be waged 
most effectively by the weapons of the spirit, and certainly these battles 
are not to be won by surrendering or abandOning (or even suspending) 
the very spiritual goods and values we propose to defend. If we accept 
for ourselves the standards and the means advocated and maintained 
by the enemy, we will have become the enemy - and the battle for the 
spirit of man will have been lost. We cannot honestly claim to be en-
gaged in a struggle for the preservation of human dignity and all the 
other ideals we proclaim if we are ready to treat the human beings who 
happen to live in the enemy cities or even wear the enemy uniforms as 
so many calculable and expendable units to be destroyed. 
To this point, then, the argument can be summarized as follows: 
since the quest for national security through violence has worked us 
into a corner where a resort to the means of violence now available to 
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us would most likely provoke our own destruction and, with it, the 
destruction of a significant part of the world's population, the techniques 
of non-violence being proposed as an alternative would present-
assuming, of course, they were given the benefit of a degree of accept-
ance and official support comparable to that lavished upon the tech-
niques of violence - the only reasonable hope for escape from that 
dilemma. Such a change, however, would require certain crucial changes 
in our contemporary value structure, including, among others, a more 
exalted estimate of the personal competence and responsibility of the 
individual and a firmer commitment to the ascetic ideal which alone 
can sustain the kind of sacrifices non-violent resistance would probably 
demand. This would also imply a diminished emphasis upon the goods 
of political freedom and national sovereignty when these come into 
competition with or threaten the more universal goods of the human 
spirit and the continued existence of humankind upon the earth. 
The Role of the Churches 
In essence, non-violence rests upon individual commitment and 
individual readiness to act according to that commitment, regardless 
of the cost such action might entail. This is to say that any policy or 
program based upon its techniques must be personalist rather than 
collectivist in approach and actualization. 
However, if non-violence is to succeed in winning respectful con-
sideration as an alternative to the present pyramiding of means of total 
destruction which has produced nothing more than a highly tenuous 
balance of terror; and if, having won such acceptance, it is to have any 
prospects of victory in a future test of strength with an opponent using 
or threatening to use the means of violence, it must be organized and 
employed on a mass scale. This means that it is not enough to base the 
movement on the support won from deviant individuals who have been 
attracted to it. These people who are always ready to demonstrate their 
individuality and independence by ~~going against the stream" what-
ever personal sacrifice this may involve are often heroic figures and fully 
deserving of honor and support. But non-violence as an instrument of 
successful international policy requires something else, a situation in 
which the desired behavior is produced by conformity to, not deviance 
from, the value orientations of the general society. In short, the How of 
the stream itself must be changed, and to accomplish this the movement 
must somehow avail itself of the influence and resources of one of the 
major social institutions charged with the task of creating and trans-
mitting the values by which men live and act. 
Of the several institutions of society which share this important 
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function, it would appear that the religious institution would be the one 
most responsive to the appeals of non-violence. It alone is sufficiently 
detached, in theory at least, from the controls and the essentially worldly 
aspirations and concerns of general society. Unlike the school, for in-
stance, which is always and almost completely the servant of whatever 
social order exists and, therefore, more resistive to any proposed value 
changes, the church - and this is stated in the Christian frame of refer-
ence with which the writer is most familiar though, he is confident, 
the same would hold true for the other world religions as well - regards 
itself as the servant of an Authority far superior to and independent of 
the particular secular order in which it operates at any given time or 
place. Furthermore, the religious institution declares its values to be 
the ultimate values, the fixed standards by which all others are to be 
judged and confirmed. It matters little that the social scientist might 
argue with this assertion and be able to demonstrate that, in actual 
practice, all religiOUS organizations tend to be much more deeply bound 
to "the wqrld" than their spokesmen are aware or care to admit and that 
even their value orientations (and certainly the application of them) 
are at times little more than reB.ections or rationalizations of the "social 
imperatives" as they are defined by the temporal authorities and by the 
human beings who constitute the living membership of these churches. 
Such findings - and they can be all too easily verified - merely show 
that the religious institution is not what it claims to be, not that it cannot 
become what it says it should be. 
Its vulnerability to the appeals of non-violence relate to what this 
writer would propose as the true self-image of the churches and the 
correct definition of their proper role. For one thing, the value changes 
suggested here show a very close fit to the values proclaimed by virtually 
all religious bodies. There is, for example, the matter of demanding 
priority for spiritual goods and the concern for the supernatural rewards 
or punishments earned by one's daily acts. Such a position obviously 
offers a "built-in" advantage for a movement which would seek a new 
ordering of values in which the goods of political freedom and personal 
survival are replaced at the head of the list by a commitment to the 
welfare of all men, including the populations of "bystander" nations 
innocently drawn into the vortex of nuclear destruction and even those 
of enemy nations. The Christian churches need but turn to their own 
history to see such a value orientation in operation: their Founder was 
Himself a citizen of an occupied nation, and the Caesar whose image 
was on the coin was the foreign oppressor. In such a context the "give 
unto Caesar" instruction, which has since been elaborated into a blanket 
order to obey any national call to arms, could more convincingly be 
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interpreted as a call to resistance (to non-violent resistance when other 
Scriptural texts are taken into account) to those demands of Caesar 
which go beyond his rightful due. This is the interpretation which seems 
to have prevailed throughout the catacomb era of Christian history, a 
period in which the goods of personal and national survival- and 
political freedom as well- were nowhere near as ultimate as they 
have come to be in the thinking of the majority of Christians who now 
seem prepared to accept virtually any extremes of violence to preserve 
them. 
Similarly, the universalism which would replace the particularist 
nationalism or other ethnocentric attachments is fully in keeping with 
the value systems of the major world religions. Christianity again pro-
vides a clear illustration. Structurally in some cases and historically in 
all, the Christian churches have ,been international and supranational 
in scope and appeal. They should, accordingly, be particularly sensitive 
to the destructive devisiveness of nationalism as a force in human affairs. 
Again, the verb form is important: one of the tragedies of the long his-
tory of Christianity is the scandalous degree to which the responsible 
leadership of most, if not all, of the Christian churches have been 
seduced by nationalistic ties and sentiments. This, too, is unfortunately 
a point of similarity with the other world religions; but the scandal is at 
its greatest when the vision of all men as the children of God redeemed 
through the saving graces of Christ's sacrifice is somehow forced into 
reconciliation with a situation in which the different nations and races 
of men stand poised behind barriers of prejudice, fear and hate, ready 
and all too willing to destroy one another. 
The religious definition of man offers other points of agreement 
with the definition proposed by the advocates of non-violence. Perhaps 
more than is true for some of the other world religions, the Christian 
heritage has always stressed the overriding importance of the individual, 
seeing in him a creation in God's own image and the direct and personal 
object of divine concern. It is unfortunately true that this heritage has 
not always and unfailingly distinguished itself in its 'willingness to trust 
that individual to determine his own course of action according to the 
lights of his own conscience; but there are hopeful signs that religious 
leaders are becoming more aware of the need to accord the faithful 
such a broadened scope of competence. Such a trend obviously offers 
great encouragement to those in the non-violence movement. As far as 
the other crucial dimension of human action is concerned, the insistence 
upon personal moral responsibility for one's actions has been a much 
more consistent element in Christian teaching. It follows, then, that 
once the broadened scope of individual competence is granted, the re-
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definition of individual responsibility included as one of the required 
changes in our present value orientation will be an almost automatic 
result. 
But to complete the set of prerequisites offered above, this re-
defined responsibility would have to be expressed in terms of what has 
been called "the ascetic ideal." It is here that the religious institution 
should prove most vulnerable to the non-violence program and its 
rationale. To draw our illustration again from the Christian heritage, 
one finds repeated evidence not only of a readiness to suffer the loss of 
all earthly good in preference to losing or sacrificing spiritual goods; 
but, in addition, the more positive note is added that such hardships 
and sufferings, even unto death, are to be regarded as a privilege to be 
welcomed. From the early martyr who rejoiced that he might be ground 
by the teeth of lions into flour for the Bread of Life down to the 
Austrian peasant, Franz Jaegerstaetter, who just before he was beheaded 
in 1943 for refusal to serve in Hitler's unjust war effort thanked God 
that he was given such an opportunity to serve Him - between these 
two the ranks of Christianity's heroes or "saints" have always been filled 
by men and women who embraced the ascetic ideal with a sense of 
total commitment. Their names and deeds are given public honor in 
the feastdays of the liturgical year, in the inspirational tales used for 
the instruction of children, and in many other forms of special recog-
nition and devotion by the faithful. 
It should not be impossible, it should not be too difficult, to induce 
the leadership of the religious communities to place more explicit 
emphasis upon the ascetic ideal behind such hallowed martyrdom and 
to be much more rigorous in awakening in their membership the aware-
ness that they, too, must be prepared to evidence that ideal in their own 
behavior when and if the occasion should ever arise. And let us be quite 
clear on this: the acceptance of non-violence as an alternative to war 
would undoubtedly present such an occasion to an untold number of 
these believers. 
In the fullest sense of religious asceticism, however, this somewhat 
grim expectation becomes at once a token of endurance and confidence. 
The practice of non-violence as the only form of resistance to the unjust 
aggressor-oppressor may indeed require generations of sacrifice and 
suffering before the victory is achieved. Here again, only in terms of the 
religious promise with its duration confounding the short-term reckon-
ing by which we mark the course of human history can we expect to 
make sense of the full potentiality of non-violence. The first great 
temporal victory of Christianity required centuries of persecution before 
it could be achieved; perhaps at least an equal period of trial and puri-
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fication must be endured before that victory can be regained. Yet such 
endurance is possible because the victory is assured. Here, again, non-
violence as an alternative to violent reactions rests upon a confidence 
born of a total act of faith in the ultimate vulnerability of evil and the 
certain invincibility of the good. We have been told that the gates of 
Hell will not prevail; and in this divine assurance the religious advocate 
of non-violence finds the rationale for the program he offers as the key 
to a moral and effective defense of the values we hold. 
But men must believe that the gates of Hell will not prevail before 
they are willing to undergo the crucial test. In this connection, whatever 
difficulty will be encountered in inspiring the necessary depth and scope 
of awareness and conviction will lie not so much in the weakness of man 
but, more likely, in two self-imposed restraints that have served to under-
mine the influence of religion upon modern society. The first is a hesi-
tancy on the part of responsible church leaders to formally and actively 
involve themselves in political or social questions which appear to be 
only indirectly or peripherally related to morality or in issues which 
do not touch upon the institutional interests of the church. Since the 
tendency has been to continually sharpen the distinction between sacred 
and secular concerns and force an ever-widening gap between them, 
we thus face a situation in which the religious institution is virtually 
isolated from those issues of paramount importance to mankind. As a 
result, we encounter the almost incomprehensible paradox of formal 
high level church pronouncements on relatively trivial matters (sex in 
movies or on book covers, financial assistance in the form of school bus 
or lunch programs, etc.) and a crashing silence on the proposed develop-
ment of the neutron bomb. 
The second restraint, in a sense the pragmatic extension of the 
first, is the frank unwillingness on the part of church leaders to impose 
what may be regarded as "too great a burden" or "impossible demands" 
upon their faithful lest such "excessive" expectations cause a drop in 
active membership or be reflected adversely in some of the other statis-
tical indices of religious behavior. Actually this attitude may be the 
most serious problem of all in that it represents a betrayal or abandon-
ment of the ascetic ideal- and with it the betrayal or abandonment of 
much of the Christian heritage. It suggests that, before the religious 
institution can assume its proper and leading role in converting the 
general population to the new value orientation required for the non-
violence alternative, the institution must itself be re-converted - or, at 
least, re-awakened - to those value affirmations and beliefs which, in 
its time of origin and its times of greatest glory, have always made it an 
institution for the transformation of society and not what it has tended 
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to become, an instrument of accommodation and conformity to the 
secular status quo. 
The tragically short reign of Pope John XXIII may have marked 
a major break with this tradition. If, as h~ declared in his momentous 
Pacem in Terris, "it is hardly possible to imagine that in the atomic era 
war could be used as an instrument of justice" - obviously the only 
basis on which war could be a permissible option for the Christian-
we may look for some effort on the part of the most powerful segment 
of the Christian Church to break away from its centuries-long and gen-
erally futile fascination by the so-called "just war" and lead the search 
for some effective and legitimate alternative to war itself. 
The Prospects 
Thus far this essay has outlined the nature of the defense alternative 
proposed by the advocate of non-violence, the new value orientation 
this alternative would require, and the part the religious institution-
especially as it is represented by the Christian churches - could be 
expected to play in bringing about these essential value changes. One 
other question of central importance remains: even granting that the 
non-violence program would constitute a more moral form of defense 
policy, does it hold sufficient promise of being effective to warrant its 
adoption by practical men in preference to the more familiar defense 
polices based on violence? 
It is immediately obvious that the proposed alternative can claim 
no victories on a scale comparable to the violent clashes of the major 
world powers. However, since it has never been put to such a test, one 
can say that it has a record of no failures at this level- a rather im-
pressive recommendation for ~t when compared with the consistent and 
ever more devastating pattern of failure registered by violence and war. 
The issue, then, may be stated in terms of a choice between a possible 
failure and a proven failure in determining long-term security and sur-
vival possibilities. This statement would apply as much to the so-called 
"limited war" as it does to the world-consuming conflicts of the past two 
generations. In a real emergency, whatever "limits" may be set at the 
outset will always prove flexible enough to permit whatever course of 
action the military or political leaders may propose as the only remain-
ing alternative to defeat, thereby reducing the "limited war" concept to 
little more than an attractive and conveniently disposable cloak for the 
nuclear holocaust it supposedly circumvents. 
The argument is sometimes advanced that this is too pessimistic 
a presentation of the possibilities. After all, one might say, the period 
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since the close of World War II offers abundant illustration of violent 
engagements that did not escalate into full-blown nuclear war. Korea, 
Vietnam, Laos and even Berlin are often cited to prove this point. The 
argument is challenging - but not necessarily convincing. If we are 
right in viewing all of these as tentative probings and responses to 
probings on the part of the two major world powers (and their sup-
porting blocs) in what has been termed "the cold war," it would seem 
that the fact that nuclear weapons have not been employed could be 
interpreted just as easily as a sign that neither power has found it 
appropriate as yet to take that step. The fact that these contacts have 
been "limited" up to this time merely testifies to the fact that neither 
contestant has yet been forced to the point of acknowledging defeat. 
The spokesmen for the radical Right have made it clear in their attacks 
upon the so-called "no win" policy that they, at least, are dissatisfied 
with this situation; should they succeed in winning a broader base of 
support, the emptiness of the "limited war" concept would soon become 
evident. 
The policy of nuclear deterrence, too, while tempting in its formula-
tion, holds no real promise as an alternative to the kind of World War III 
which would claim the horrifying toll contemplated in even the most 
optimistic estimates advanced by its proponents. An empty threat with 
no intent to follow through with the use of nuclear weapons under any 
conceivable circumstance simply will not deter. Yet once any such intent, 
however faint or however simulated, is admitted, it necessarily opens 
the way to the same grim progression described in connection with the 
limited war concept; for we cannot hope to convince a potential enemy 
that we will actually use the bombs "as a last resort" without convincing 
ourselves as well. And "the last resort" will always prove to be much 
more imminent than we thought. 
The "close-call" at the time of the Cuba emergency, generally taken 
as incontestable proof that deterrence works, also illustrates the immi-
nence of "the last resort." No one can deny, of course, that both major 
powers were forced to a level of circumspection in their actions because 
their leaders took the possible effects of a nuclear exchange into account; 
to this extent, it was a success for the advocates of deterrence. However, 
in another very important sense, it reveals a distinct failure - and a 
shocking measure of hypocrisy. The failure lies in the fact that the 
American action was specifically predicated on a readiness to escalate 
the limited Cuban threat into a full-scale and world-wide nuclear ex-
change. And there was no wave of horrified protest; on the contrary, 
it was generally taken for granted that our military forces would have 
no alternative but to use whatever means were available and might 
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have been required to bring about the stated objective of dismantling 
and removing the missiles. 
This is where the hypocrisy comes in. For that objective represented 
an official repudiation of the logic of deterrence for others. Weeks before 
the installation of the missiles, evidence had been accumulating of 
another projected invasion of Castro's Cuba with either direct or in-
direct American involvement. Under the circumstances, the defenders 
could have covered their island several times over with the kind of 
"defensive weapons" enumerated as permissible by the President; but, 
it should have been obvious to everyone, this would have merely delayed 
a foregone conclusion and made it somewhat more costly for the invasion 
forces. The only kind of weapon by which the Cuban government (and 
the Soviet ally committed to come to its assistance) could have hoped 
to deter its giant adversary would be precisely the kind of weapon 
involved in the controversy. If Polaris missiles in the Mediterranean 
are "defensive" against Soviet threats to "bury us" and our NATO allies, 
Soviet missiles in Cuba have to be recognized as "defensive" for that 
nation, subjected as it was (and still is) to the threat to its security 
from the North. Let this argument not be misinterpreted: I firmly oppose 
the installation of missiles in Cuba or anywhere else; and I was, as a 
result, most happy to see them dismantled and removed. And it is pos-
sible for me, as an opponent of the deterrence theory, to take this position 
and be consistent, whereas it should be something of a logical embarrass-
ment for the advocates of such a policy to offer a convincing explanation 
of why sauce for the goose should not also serve as sauce for the gander. 
Cuba was just one illustrative incident. Before and since then lead-
ing representatives of the military and those who have joined them in 
the frank espousal of pre-emptive war, or who see the nuclear bombing 
of North Vietnam military centers as a solution to our difficulties in the 
Near East, have given evidence enough by their impatience that "the 
last resort" is really always just around the corner. In one of his major 
policy addresses, President Kennedy warned against extremists who 
offer what he described as the false dichotomies of choice between 
«appeasement or war, suicide or surrender, humiliation or holocaust." 
One may agree with his warning and yet, at the same time, regret that his 
defense of his administration's foreign and defense policies reveals a com.-
parable failure to recognize any alternative to violence itself in main-
taining a strong position between these false dichotomies. It is proposed 
here that such an alternative must be found and that it does, in fact, 
exist. The alternative of non-violence represents neither weakness, nor 
appeasement, nor surrender, nor humiliation. Instead, it represents a 
new kind of force, a power to compel and to defend. Gandhi described 
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the difference in 1932 as he prepared to enter upon his famous fast 
unto death: "Violent pressure is felt on the physical being and it degrades 
him who uses it as it depresses the victim, but non-violent pressure 
exerted through self-suffering, as by fasting, works in an entirely differ-
ent way. It touches not the physical body, but it touches and strengthens 
the moral fibre of those against whom it is directed." 
Seen in this light, non-violence becomes a real option, the only 
option, its advocates would insist, holding promise of ultimate success; 
for if even one nation - our own - could be awakened to its promise 
and be prepared to pursue it, the world could finally be freed from the 
vicious circle of violence in which it is now locked and the way opened 
to a security based on those greater and surer kinds of force incorpo-
rating a power which until now we have not dared to consider, much 
less exploit. Instead of continuing our present descent to total in-
humanity, we would be making a significant and long-overdue turning 
in the direction of a renewed act of faith in the humanity of our potential 
enemy - and ourselves. 
For we are dealing with something far more profound than a mere 
difference in policy options. Our question ultimately concerns our basic 
conceptions of man. Is man, after all is said and done, a creature whose 
behavior is finally controlled through promises of physically satisfying 
rewards and threats of violently induced pain; or is he something 
greater, the deepest wellsprings of whose behavior contain forces re-
sponsive only to the power of love and recognition of common identity? 
If we deny the latter possibility, we deny many o(the core values upon 
which we base our claims to a preferable way of life and, indeed, our 
hopes for any future advance for humankind. The non-violence alterna-
tive takes these values seriously enough to propose them as the founda-
tion of our defense action. The belief that all men share a common 
humanity which cannot be totally or permanently suppressed; the 
corollary that every man (including the Roman tyrant, the Buchenwald 
guard, the Communist oppressor, yes, even the indifferent RAND 
theorist at his computer) has a "breaking point" beyond which his 
participation in patterned inhumanity cannot be forced; and, finally, 
the confidence that a disciplined, large-scale exercise of the moral power 
of sacrificial "love" or "soul force" will most surely bring him to that 
breaking point and thereby negate whatever power of violence he may 
have at his disposal: these deserve a far more receptive hearing than 
they have received from those supposedly committed to the defense of 
the West and its Judeo-Christian foundations. 
If, as history has demonstrated, the way of violence demands an 
ever more thorough-going renunciation of this common humanity and 
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its implications for our own behavior, coupled with a callous ignoring 
of the humanity of the enemy, it should be rejected as a policy option 
not worthy of consideration. Otherwise, in the process of "defending" 
these most cherished values we may find ourselves forced to abandon 
and betray them in our total surrender to the inevitably destructive 
logic of violence. 
Its advocates, then, regard non-violence as the most effective and 
most promising defense policy. There are, of course, no guarantees. The 
mounting of a well-conceived and disciplined campaign of civil dis-
obedience and non-cooperation against an opponent using the means 
of violence might end with total victory for the latter. But grim as this 
prospect admittedly is, even it could be preferable to the kind of world 
promised us as the aftermath of a Third World War - for victor and 
vanquished alike. At least such a defeat would leave us with the hope 
that civilized mankind spared from the near-total destruction nuclear 
war would have brought will be able to make a new start toward the 
freedom and dignity that is temporarily suppressed. And throughout 
the <'dark ages" imposed by the victor, they would find the way lighted 
for them in that upward struggle by the inspiring memory of the 
sacrifices made in heroic testimony to the imperishable and indestructible 
spark of goodness to be found in every man just because he is a man. 
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